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Social Development in Pakistan 
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of infrastructure and the provision of basic services in 
Pakistan lie in the public domain. The quality of the built infrastructure and the 
service offered reflect successive governments’ capability as a channel for public 
sector funds, their role in overall financial and macro-economic planning and 
management, and their administrative efficiency in implementation, operations and 
management—in essence the extent to which they are able to adhere to the principles 
of good and humane governance. Good governance is generally conceived of as the 
judicious exercise of economic, political and administrative authority in the public 
and private spheres to manage a country’s affairs at all levels to improve the quality 
of life of the people. It is a continuing process where divergent opinions and desires 
are satisfied through compromise and tolerance in a spirit of cooperative action for 
the mutual benefit of the larger whole. It has three dimensions: one, the political 
regime; two, the systems and procedures for exercising authority; and three, the 
capacity of governments [World Bank (1994); UNDP (1997); OECD (1995); 
Commission on Global Governance (1995)]. 
When Pakistan gained political freedom in August 1947, it inherited an 
economic and social infrastructure unable to meet the demands of the large influx of 
refugees from India. Five decades later, policies emphasising public investment, 
subsidised credit and regulated private sector development have generated strong 
economic growth, but failed to implement successful social development. Over the 
last 50 years and more Pakistan’s economy, measured through its GDP, has grown 
by more than 10 times, an average annual growth rate of 5.1 percent. Rapid 
population growth, estimated to have averaged just under 3 percent annually, has 
resulted in real per capita increases of only 2.1 percent per year. Social development, 
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measured through the Human Development Index, has not been as impressive. Table 
1 shows that this has increased annually by about 1.7 percent, and by 1997 has only 
just more than doubled over the last five decades. 
To mitigate this imbalance, Pakistan in 1992 launched the Social Action 
Programme (SAP) with the help of donor assistance. With rural deprivation a major 
problem, it was decided that SAP should have a rural focus. As well, SAP was to 
take an integrated approach to the four key sectors—primary education, primary 
health, rural water supply and population welfare. These were chosen both because 
they were the most basic social services required by the population and because of 
the obvious linkages and potential for synergy between them. In 1997-98 the second 
phase of SAP was launched. With the large injection of funds into the social sector 
was SAP able to achieve its objectives? All stakeholders would agree that generally 
SAP’s sole claim to achievement is in enhancing the resources available to the social 
sectors. It has had a mixed response in the realm of institutional reform, which was 
to be its guiding principle. Reviews, appraisals and evaluations (SPDC; WB; ADB; 
Auditor General; MSU) all suggest that the programme is in jeopardy. The 
government itself agrees that economic and social development has not been evenly 
distributed throughout the country and the gap between the rich and poor has 
widened. The level of social development remains extremely low, particularly in the 
rural areas and especially among females. Unrelenting population growth has 
impeded improvements in the quality of life for a large segment of the population. 
This has, in turn, led to rising social tensions. 
 
Table 1 
Trends in Economic and Human Development in Pakistan Since Independence 
     Year  Real GDP Index 




1949-50 74 93  89 
1959-60 100  100 100 
1969-70 192  135 120 
1979-80 308  160 131 
1989-90 538  217 159 
1994-95 714  245 172 
1998-99 835  260 193
1 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate  5.07%  2.12%  1.66% 
Sources: 
1Pakistan (Various Issues). 
  
2United Nations Development Programme (Various Issues). 
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What has led to this dichotomy in development? This paper attempts to 
identify the impediments to the development of the social sectors, amplify on some 
of them, and in the final analysis suggest a series of solutions most of which are not 
for the short-term. 
 
UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR POOR DEVELOPMENT 
Senior politicians and government officers are aware that the machinery of 
government has contributed to the present state of affairs and that the management of 
the resources available to Pakistan has not been sufficiently strong to obtain the best 
value for money. Honest and diligent officials are frustrated with systems and 
procedures which are cost ineffective; the populace is faced with a political and 
bureaucratic system which is unaccountable and is not responsive to need; the 
entrepreneur is faced with a set of policies which contradict each other, are counter-
productive, are incoherent and designed to assist in increasing corruption and are as 
constant as the changing winds; and the poor are faced with a situation where their 
plight is not seen sympathetically. The origins of these weaknesses can be traced to 
the evolution of the government bureaucracy. Designed to serve the coloniser’s 
needs and the interest’s of a ruling elite, Pakistan’s bureaucratic system has become 
increasingly corrupt and incompetent over time. In addition, because it is trained and 
encouraged to serve the interests of a ruling elite, rather than to respond to the 
changing needs of the population, the provision of social services remains seriously 
out of sync with the demand. 
Reviews of social sector projects [Auditor General (1997); MSU (1997); WB 
(1998); ADB (1996, 1997); SPDC (1997, 1998, 1999)], conclude that problems stem 
from bad governance, are sector-wide and hinder the cost-effective delivery of services. 
These fall within three broad areas: firstly, legislative framework which sets the 
boundaries within which institutions, agencies and agents can operate and therefore 
addresses issues related to devolution, discretion and accountability; secondly, political 
structures which determine the way in which we are governed; and lastly the inter-
twined trio of:  institutional capacity which identifies the ability of institutions, agencies 
and agents to make policies, ensure coherence and coordination and ensure compliance;  
management which addresses issues related to the proper use of systems and procedures 
and the mechanisms used for the development of infrastructure and the delivery of 
services by ensuring that there is an equitable and transparent access to goods and 
services and protection of public interest from private intrusion; and efficiency which 
addresses issues of resource generation, expenditure planning, expenditure control, 
regulation and overall public administration to ensure the most effective use of resources. 
 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The allocation of responsibilities between various tiers of government are 
enunciated in the Constitution and in a large body of legislation. However, except for Zafar H. Ismail  720
a few areas no clear-cut allocation of responsibilities is specified where more than 
one tier of government is involved [AERC (1990); Inbucon (1991); Ismail (1996, 
1998)]. While the principle of such an overlap are implicit, that is, the highest tier is 
responsible for overall policy formulation and coordination of the activity across 
lower tiers and the lower tiers are responsible for actual implementation, this is 
nowhere clearly stated. Thus a number of functions are improperly addressed or are 
not undertaken by default. In addition, a number of functions are best performed at 
the lower tiers of government, because of the need to interact with beneficiaries, but 
have been legislatively assigned to higher tiers. This dichotomy needs to be 
removed. 
In theory and legislatively, the provincial governments are responsible for the 
development of the social sector (i.e., capital investment), and are supposed to hand 
over the responsibility for the operation, maintenance and delivery of services to the 
local councils or beneficiary communities. In fact, the provincial governments are 
loath to transfer these responsibilities because they are a lucrative source of 
patronage and rents. The complex character of this fragmentation of structures and 
responsibility has been highlighted in a number of studies and can be seen from the 
matrix of some of the responsibilities for the planning, development, management, 
operations, maintenance, and delivery of civic and social services in the metropolitan 
area of Karachi shown in Appendix 1. As can be seen, all three tiers of government 
and civil society organisations are involved. This dichotomy of responsibility results 
in inappropriate procedures, poor planning, improper budgeting, financial 
mismanagement, and flawed personnel policies. This can to a large extent be 
overcome by a clearer definition of the several tiers of government so that 
dichotomy, fragmentation and duplication of responsibilities are removed and 
authority is clearly defined and demarcated. 
The link between maximising benefits from investment in infrastructure and 
the provision of services on the one hand and the involvement of the beneficiaries in 
the process from start to finish has been demonstrated around the globe. This is the 
principal and basic tenet for the implementation of the Social Action Programme 
with a view to achieving the best value for money. While this is an explicit statement 
of the government, legislation and mechanisms to ensure that such participation is 
built into the process has not yet been devised adequately. To ensure that this 
objective is attained, the required mechanism needs to be designed and tested before 
the legislation needed to ensure this is drafted and enacted. One such mechanism 
could be the employment of Non-Governmental Organisations in the process. The 
involvement of NGOs in the development process and making communities aware of 
their rights, responsibilities and obligations has been developed to some extent, but is 
largely manifest as case studies or in isolated pockets with the help of bilateral donor 
agencies. However, this needs to be studied in depth to draw lessons for replicability 
generally using a mix of public sector funds and private sector entrepreneurship. Impediments to Social Development  721
A small but rapidly growing segment of the population’s view of legislation in 
Pakistan is that all legislation is passed without adequate drafting skills resulting in 
lacunae which may be used for access to pecuniary benefits by vested interests. 
Moreover, there are built-in provisions for the executive to sub-legislate (make rules 
and regulations), powers to set aside any mandatory requirement, waive any 
mandatory prohibitive provisions either  “for the public good” or “in the public 
interest” (both euphemisms for my personal pocket) without reference to any elected 
controlling body of individuals and/or the ability to report on actions ex-post. While 
these have been included to mitigate extreme cases of hardship, in reality, however, 
these have tended to be used indiscriminately for personal gain. In addition, 
discretionary quotas for access to infrastructure, services and economic opportunity 
provide rents to the chosen few at the cost of the exchequer. These lead to distortions 
and inefficiency in public institutions and are seen to be a major avenue for 
corruption. 
Lax legislation linked to poor governance leads to, may encourages and 
breeds, corruption in a number of ways, for instance through bribery and extortion, 
influence peddling and nepotism, and fraud and embezzlement. It reduces the 
efficiency on which an economy depends, and by increasing the cost of investment 
lowers the potential return. It also reduces the government’s resources and hence its 
capacity for investment. 
As in the rest of South Asia corruption in Pakistan is unique because it occurs 
up-stream, it has wings which encourage flight of capital rather than wheels which 
encourage re-investment and it often rewards rather than punishes as the legal 
processes to fight corruption are weak in themselves and the lower judiciary is 
amenable to letting off the accused if the ‘price is right’. As elsewhere, corruption 
has had adverse effects on human development which contributes to people’s 
inability to fight corruption through an improvement in governance as a result of 
deprivation of knowledge, literacy and rights, and has also skewed public sector 
investment priorities which favour large visible projects where the chances for rent-
seeking are substantial. 
At the heart of the problem lies the corruption equation, first devised by 
Robert Klitgaard in 1988: 
Corruption    =  f (Monopoly power, discretion, accountability, low 
government salaries). 
The combination of monopoly power and discretion alone is a disastrous 
combination. When linked to the absence of accountability and low legal earnings 
they become more than just lethal. Studies in Pakistan [AERC (1990); Inbucon 
(1993); Ismail (1996, 1998); ADB (1996)] have concluded that most, if not all, laws, 
rules and regulations exist only to create an environment for corruption. Some have 
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because of the built in inconsistencies and contradictions. They create monopolies 
because power is centralised and they provide immense discretion to set aside any 
law regulation and rule in the public interest. 
One obvious mechanism to eliminate corruption would be to review 
legislation which helps breed corruption, such as through creating monopoly power, 
permitting discretion without checks and balances, exercising authority without 
responsibility. Parallel to this should be an effort to reform the judicial system 
generally. Another mechanism would be to introduce legislation which is effectively 
implemented through an impartial and independent authority (with substantial 
representation from civil society and the senior members of the judiciary) with 
exemplary punishment. Corresponding changes in the laws of evidence and trial 
should allow for flexibility in procedures and rigour of evidence. The double 
standards prevalent in the developed world, particularly the safe havens of 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas, and now also the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom impose stiff legal challenges to 
the laundering of money generated from drugs, but a similar treatment to bribes, 
extortion, embezzlement and fraud is conspicuous by its absence. This needs to be 
rectified urgently. 
The lack of transparency in the system is typified by the budgeting and 
planning process itself. The budgeting and financial management procedures are 
obscurantist. For instance, detailed budget breakdowns are invariably not presented, 
expenditure decisions outside the budget framework through executive orders are 
normal, the failure to disclose or even to discuss military spending is the rule, the 
limited data on revenue collection, and the absence of detailed information on new 
amendments and ordinances. In the planning and development management arena, 
there is no civil society representation in the selection of projects, ex-ante executive 
approval outside the normal minimal approval processes are becoming the order of 
the day, and variations from approved or designed specifications are condoned by 
‘amenable’ officials. What is required is legislated free access to information, even 
military spending, the inclusion of civil society in planning and development 
management and independent monitoring, particularly by a free and investigative 
media. 
Pakistan requires disclosure of wealth by officials and elected representatives. 
Follow-up action is missing. Legislation should be enacted which provides for a 
mandatory cross-verification of declarations for a minimum sample of returns. 
Delayed and no-returns should be penalised severely. In the event that investigation 
reveals concealment or mis-declaration, then an independent tribunal of the senior 
most judges and civil society representatives drawn from professional accountants 
(who should be elected for three year terms) should order punishment after due 
process. Punishments should include, confiscation of property, jail and severance 
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In summary, the action needed to eliminate corruption should include the 
following elements nationally: 
  • Begin accountability from the top. 
  • Set up national anti-corruption commissions and appoint an independent 
watchdog. 
  • Set up exclusive corruption courts. 
  • End unnecessary or archaic discretionary laws. 
  • Enact legislation to improve accountability, ensure transparency, punish the 
corrupt severely and ensure time bound action. 
  • Require public officials to declare their assets. 
  • Provide immunity to informers. 
  • Pass a Right to Information Bill. 
  • Use independent private-sector auditors. 
  •  Involve people in diagnosing corrupt systems. 
  • Implement core institutional reforms and repair corrupt systems. 
  • Ensure an active and free press. 
It is also necessary that parallel action at the international level should also be 
undertaken so that the double standards which exist are removed. Such actions, 
should include: 
  • Making all bribes given in industrialised countries illegal. 
  • Ensuring that all ‘illegal’ money and property transactions in industrialised 
countries is treated at par with drug money. 
  • Linking aid to humane governance through a programme funding mechanism 
“such as under IMF’s ESAF/EFF, and the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Loans or Programme Loans are structured such that circumventing any 
conditionality becomes nearly impossible. These provide initial bridge 
financing to start the process of change and specify benchmarks which are 
quantifiable and verifiable exogenously by third parties. They must be 
achieved before any subsequent tranche is released. Disbursement is either 
withheld or delayed pending compliance, thereby providing both the carrot and 
the stick to encourage the implementation of change” [SPDC (1999)]. 
Indeed, all stakeholders in the social sectors acknowledge that there are major 
deficiencies in the coverage and performance of the basic social sector infrastructure 
and services in both urban and rural areas resulting from the built-in weaknesses in 
the legislative framework stemming from the Constitution of Pakistan itself and also 
from the body of legislation. They further acknowledge that an enormous and 
complex effort is required to remedy these deficiencies. This limits the institutional 
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Further, the centralisation of authority and the need to wield patronage has 
intentionally left communities out of the decision-making process and the 
accompanying operations and maintenance effort. In essence, the political structure 
also contributes to the lack of social development in Pakistan. 
 
POLITICAL STRUCTURES 
Politics is about the creation and distribution of power and governance is the 
mechanism which controls the relationship between the two extremes—the governed 
and the governors. The political process lies at the core of governance. This can be 
efficient only if elections are free and fair; the elected are accountable; authority is 
divided between the legislature, the bureaucracy and the judiciary; and, power is 
decentralised. 
Unfortunately, Pakistan does not meet all of these criteria. The lethal 
combination of powerful personalities or families linked together by familial and 
economic interests, on the one hand, and weak institutions, on the other, has resulted 
in the subversion of law which lacks accountability, creates processes which are 
largely personal and informal and allow rulers to operate outside established 
institutional frameworks. Democracy in Pakistan is confined largely to the ballot 
(purchased or coerced) box—and that too for the legislatures only. Political parties 
do not hold elections for office. Decision-making is controlled by the powerful elite. 
Sovereignty is equated to powerful governments, not free citizens. Democracy has 
not been translated into visible benefits for the poor. Pakistan’s people continue to 
remain, perhaps, the least well endowed amongst Asians generally with respect to 
literacy, health, incomes, and freedom. HDC (1999) postulates that legitimate 
governments are, therefore, not necessarily good governments and queries “Can 
people be truly free when they have no control over their destinies?”  The moral 
foundation of Governments in Pakistan has been eroded through electoral fraud, 
money politics, criminalisation of the political system and increasing corruption in 
public life. 
The same powerful families appear to be the leaders of any government in 
power because each branch of a family is a member of another political party and 
most families are related to each other through marriage. They also constitute a fair 
portion of the senior bureaucracy, the higher judiciary and the military as the 
youngest are “encouraged” to seek a career, implicitly to protect their elders from the 
ravages of law. Thus they control the economy, deny access to social services to the 
disadvantaged segments of society, and the benefits of growth have accrued to them 
disproportionately. 
The elite power structure consists of landlords (who have a disproportionate 
share of seats in the legislatures and policy-making agencies in government and 
thereby frustrate reform), a handful of large industrialists (who cumulatively control 
resources which are equal to or greater than the national budget), bureaucrats (who Impediments to Social Development  725
have gained power as a consequence of weak political structures) and the military 
(who have overtly ruled for half or more of the time and covertly for considerably 
longer). The last of the quartet justify their rule as a consequence of a breakdown in 
civil rule and political governments failing to legitimise themselves. 
There is a growing realisation that decentralising, or ensuring local level 
participation in development and service delivery is the best method of ensuring 
equitable growth, human development and pro-people governance. The desire for 
decentralisation is also fuelled by ethnic diversity. There is demand for the institution 
of effective local government systems, not the watered down versions which exist 
today. In Pakistan local government elections have been held (other than in Sindh), 
but have been replaced by nominated bodies ostensibly on the plea that they are 
corrupt. A case of the pot calling the kettle black? 
The power structures and power nexus formed in the higher tiers of 
government are replicated at the lower levels. In Pakistan, which has a federal 
structure, the local councillors are the younger brethren or sons of the Members of 
Assemblies and the contractors are their kith and kin. Thus the benefits to be derived 
from decentralisation are lost. Thus decentralisation is only in form and not spirit. 
Further, Pakistan portrays a confused form of federalism. It has never 
accepted the basic principles of federalism—the exercise of independent authority 
within their assigned (separated) areas. The constitution itself enshrines this situation 
through the overlapping of functions and authority contained in what is called the 
combined legislative list without specifying the bifurcation between the federal and 
provincial governments. The federal government has tended to usurp the authority of 
the lower tier and the predominance of Punjab, the largest province, in both the 
elected and bureaucratic institutions is a peculiar feature. There is also legislative 
authority to set aside state/provincial governments under exceptional circumstances. 
The lower tiers of government are dependent financially on the higher tiers. In 
Pakistan the provinces account for 25 percent and 6 percent respectively of public 
expenditure and revenue. The dependence of local governments, particularly in the 
small towns and rural areas is even severer. The smallest local governments are 
totally dependent for resources on the state/provincial governments. Moreover, both 
inter- and intra-tier sharing of revenues is a source of acrimony. This disparity in 
resource generation results from the allocation of tax bases, the more buoyant (trade 
and income) being apportioned to the federal level. This is further exacerbated by the 
lack of political will to collect resources. 
Efficiency is a cardinal principle for good governance and only the right 
responsive political structures can ensure this. Thus, this will accrue from assigning 
functional responsibility to that governmental organisation which is closest to the 
people. However, such assignment must be consistent with the efficient delivery of 
that service. This non-hierarchical assignment permits a more constructive and 
dynamic relationship. For instance, the delivery of primary health care, primary Zafar H. Ismail  726
education, water supply and sanitation, targeted distribution of social safety benefits 
are best delivered through local governmental institutions. 
Effective local governance can be assured only through the active 
participation of a representative body of elected officials which has a constitutionally 
assured permanence, has participatory representation (say through proportional 
representation and quotas for women, minorities and marginalised people), has 
constitutionally legislated responsibilities and authority (regulation and provision of 
the full range of services that can equitably meet the needs of the community), and 
has an assured financial resource base which is not encroached on by higher tiers of 
government, either directly or indirectly. Fiscal policy should clearly assign which 
taxes may be levied by whom, and if shared, assure a mechanism which ensures 
automatic credit by the Central Bank/Treasury without reference to any 
governmental body. 
The principle that the spending agency should also be the collecting agency 
should govern all tax assignment between tiers of government. For instance, all 
property and property related taxes are normally considered to lie in the realm of 
local governments. Worldwide these form the base through which resources are 
generated for maintaining basic infrastructure and finance some of the development 
and operations cost of primary services. In most of South Asia these have been 
encroached upon by the higher tiers of government and assessing and collecting 
responsibilities have been usurped by these higher spheres. These responsibilities 
should be shifted down to ensure an assured, stable and buoyant revenue source and 
also prudent expenditure management. 
To ensure adequate funding for capital works, the larger local governmental 
organisations should also be assured access to capital markets. In Pakistan 
particularly, local governments should not be dependent on a system of erratic grants 
for development purposes. These must be provided for routinely. 
Accountability of both the elected and the administrative hierarchy ensures 
adherence to standards and goals. This should be ensured, firstly through audit by 
non-governmental professional audit organisations, and secondly by prosecution 
through an independent tribunal under a legal framework which mandates a time-
bound process. Accountability also requires that there should be greater transparency 
and openness (accessibility) in the system. This can be assured through a number of 
actions, such as: 
  • Beneficiary participation in planning (through a system of committees with 
beneficiary representation in addition to councillors, and backed by 
mandatory public hearings and advertising in the media inviting public 
objections). 
  • Participatory budgeting (involvement of councillors in the preparation of 
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  • Involvement of the non-profit and for-profit non-governmental/private sector 
institutions. 
  • Increasing  public awareness. 
  • Simplification  of processes. 
  • Public participation and audit of council debates and access to information. 
Operational management must conform also to standards and goals. 
Beneficiary participation in the setting of goals and standards should be assured 
through a mandatory process of public hearings by elected representatives and 
nominees of citizens’ rights groups. Participatory planning should be seen as an 
opportunity and not a threat. 
Weak political structures have resulted in the creation of weak institutions, the 
lack of efficiency from planning to delivering services, particularly in the social 
sectors, and poor management of resources, man, material and financial. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, EFFICIENCY AND MANAGEMENT 
The full set of institutions (legislative, administrative and judicial) are 
transplants by the raj and, therefore, do not serve the needs and aspirations of the 
populace.  Society in Pakistan is largely informal and based on kinship where 
patronage plays a major role. The general perception of the common man is: his 
elected representative is available only when he wants his vote; the bureaucracy and 
the judiciary is there to serve the rich and powerful. The judiciary has been subverted 
by executive power, the bureaucracy is politicised and demoralised in all of South 
Asia and the executive is accountable in name only. The systems are fragile, 
unresponsive to people’s needs and corrupt. Therefore, discretion, arbitrariness and 
political expediency rule all decision-making. Institutions are thus weakened, 
transaction costs are high and misgovernance increases. 
At the root of the institutional decay lie the legislatures themselves. 
Legislators are by their very nature expected to be watchdogs, regulators, and law-
makers. They are supposed to be representatives of civil society. Legislatures, by and 
large, are expected to be composed of individuals of merit and integrity. However, in 
Pakistan legislators generally are seen to have bought their position to power, are 
poorly educated (as opposed to schooled). Attendance in Parliament is poor and 
women representation is minimal. Debates in parliaments are endless and restricted 
to constituency politics only and policy and decision-making is left in the hands of 
an overpowering executive. This weakness in the legislatures is also due to a blurring 
of the separation of powers between the three pillars of state. Law-making is the 
responsibility of the Supreme Court also, largely through its rulings which set 
precedents. The bureaucracy, in parallel with the executive, continues to wield 
immense power over policy formulation and implementation, for instance, by 
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125 in 1996). The judiciary has also played a role in weakening the legislature. As an 
example, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has permitted the dissolution of Parliament 
on a number of occasions. 
The executive is made of the head of government, the cabinet and civil 
servants. While the former have tenure and are not necessarily of the highest calibre, 
the latter are permanent and should be of the highest calibre and above politics. The 
former is responsible for policy and supervising implementation, the latter is 
required to administer and advise. To the public it is this latter which is government. 
It has been argued that the most powerful civil institution of Pakistan is the 
bureaucracy. But they have forgotten that they are public servants and not the rulers. 
By their very permanence, politicians have had to influence them through patronage 
which has led to the erosion of them as an institution. They are an all pervasive 
anachronism left from the days of the raj. Their major functions continue to be 
economic and law and order, in both of which they have failed. The provision of 
social services remain neglected. 
The highly layered hierarchy adds significantly to the cost of service delivery, 
impedes the smooth functioning of departments, and is a siphon for leakages and 
delays in implementation. The initial rationale may have been to either decentralise 
authority as much as possible, or to create a barrier between the beneficiary and the 
authority  responsible for providing the service. Over the years, however, the concept 
of decentralised management and control has been seriously eroded. The creation of 
administrative units, latch on organisations for foreign aided projects and political 
patronage have all meant that today the civil service is bloated and its size is 
increasing. This is diametrically opposite to world trends where the size of 
government is shrinking. Recent studies [Pakistan (1996, 1997); WB (1999)] have 
indicated that a substantial part of the civil service employees are redundant. As 
growth has slackened public sector employment has risen, largely because this is 
seen to be the best avenue for employment. The composition of the civil services is 
also skewed in comparison to the rest of the world. In Pakistan there is one officer 
for 15 other staff. In Bangladesh (which only three decades ago was the eastern half 
of Pakistan) the ratio is 1:7. The norm of 1:3 is recommended by all agencies. 
Further the quality of civil servants has been eroded because of quota-based 
employment. This in turn has made it easier for the politicisation of the services. 
Only 10 percent of intake is based on merit compared to 40 percent in Bangladesh. 
The sheer size of the bureaucracy makes it inefficient and wasteful. Even though real 
wages are lower than in the private sector and are declining, the total wage bill 
consumes 56 percent of the non-defence, non-interest current expenditures [WB 
(1999a)]. The decline in real wages has led to a consequential increase in corruption, 
at times in collusion with politicians. The differential in public and private sector 
wages has compounded this problem. Some estimates suggest that the most 
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domestic (non-multinational) private sector. The differential increases with seniority. 
Thus talent is not attracted. 
HDC (1999) concludes that “the institution has had to face intense political 
interference in the form of both coercion and patronage”. Those who are loyal 
receive better (more “lucrative”) postings and more rapid promotions. Demotion, 
political appointment, lateral entry, ad hoc transfers, and bureaucratic reshuffle are 
only a few of the mechanisms used to ensure loyalty. Large scale arbitrary 
termination and transfers have resulted in a further lowering of morale and neutrality. 
On the flip side, they exert considerable influence over politicians largely owing to 
the immature nature of political parties and institutions. 
Even though legislation may exist which allows for an efficient allocation of 
responsibilities and ensuring transparency and accountability in public 
administration, unless institutions have the corresponding capacity and capability, no 
change may be forthcoming to ensure efficiency in development process and 
delivery of services. The public institutions in Pakistan are today faced with a 
multitude of shortages and shortcomings. There is a skill shortage for identifying and 
enunciating coherent and coordinated policies; the prevailing work ethos discourages 
officials from ensuring compliance; systems and procedures are cumbersome and 
outdated; mechanisms to ensure coordination exist but are not implemented— 
meetings of the secretaries’ committees have not been held for years on end; there is 
continuous interference in day-to-day management by vested interests; staff is 
inadequately trained both ab initio and subsequently on-job because of the very 
short-term assignment to posts; staff selection, posting and promotions are not merit 
related; and the incentive structure is designed to penalise the performers. 
Some fundamentally sound administrative rules and regulations have been 
allowed to fall into decay or have been regularly circumvented. There is a need to 
return, in many cases, to the formal procedures as originally defined, but, in other 
cases, an opportunity should now be taken to re-draw them to reduce, if not totally 
remove, the opportunity and hence the temptation to by-pass them. It must be 
realised at the outset that any process of change affecting policies and the practices 
that have become entrenched over the years will be viewed with apprehension by 
some of those directly involved and the changes will require sensitive handling. 
Central to the creation of institutional capacity is the effective decentralisation 
of functions. This means that financial powers, administrative authority and 
commensurate responsibility must be given to lower echelons but within a tight 
regulatory framework. The current practice of requests for supplementary grants 
would, therefore, have to be done away with and the current powers to authorise 
expenditures in excess of budget allocation would need to be exercised in the same 
manner as the budget allocation itself, that is by the legislature in assembly through a 
process of dialogue “ex-ante”. Zafar H. Ismail  730
Civil service reforms need to be introduced to make the public official 
answerable for his actions. The current status of “permanent non-terminable” 
employment must be replaced by a system where the inefficient or the corrupt can be 
weeded out within a short time frame. Staff skills need to be developed to use 
modern management techniques. Mere attendance at courses operated by civil 
service training institutions does not constitute training. Civil servants must be 
required to show absorption of training skills by results in tests and examination (as 
is done in the defence forces). This should help in weeding out the incompetent. 
With greater reliance on the private sector for the development of infrastructure and 
the provision of services large public sector employment is unjustified. The objective 
would be to, at least, reduce overall public sector employment to a third of its current 
size. 
Efficiency can be achieved in a number of ways. One may be the use of 
appropriate mechanisms which ensure the greatest value for money. Other ways may 
include pro-active legislation (rather than retro-active) ensuring target based 
management, or through the use of information to analyse shortcomings and suggest 
ways to improve. Yet others may be the use of regulatory mechanisms which ensure 
that private sector provision of services and development of infrastructure does not 
create rents for the vested segments of society. 
While private sector participation can to a large extent overcome a number of 
shortcomings in the development of infrastructure and in the provision of services, 
unless controlled and regulated it could lead to situations of monopoly and oligopoly. 
This would result in excessive rents accruing only to the few agents involved in the 
process to the detriment of the disadvantaged. The legislative framework establishes 
the boundaries within which the public-private partnership can take place. However, 
these laws will need to be translated into a workable and transparent regulatory 
framework. While some regulatory agencies exist, they deal largely with matters 
related to the corporate sectors and are only now beginning to address issues related 
to the environment. The existing institutions are manned largely by staff without the 
skills needed to ensure compliance, the knowledge and understanding needed to 
adapt to a rapidly changing operating environment and the systems and procedures 
which could generate the mutual trust between the two agents—the regulators and 
the entrepreneurs. 
The constant interference in day-to-day management by vested interest groups 
also impedes the maintenance of infrastructure and delivery of services in the social 
sectors. The fact that elected officials are given a quota of jobs to hand out as they 
see fit ensures that merit plays no role in the appointment of low-level staff. There 
are countless examples of teachers being appointed who have neither the 
qualifications nor experience required. Postings and transfers are made to suit the 
convenience of politicians. The mandated tenure of 3 years stipulated in the Rules of 
Business has not been applied now for the last two decades or more. In fact, the trend 
in the length of service in post has been asymptotic (tending to zero) in character. Impediments to Social Development  731
In the past, many approaches have been tried to coordinate the actions of all 
parties with an interest in social development, but these have failed, and the 
administrative arrangements have withered away. One such example is the 
Secretary’s Committee in each province. It was intended to be a forum to coordinate 
interests and plans and to review improper demands being placed by the politicians 
within a framework of set criteria. These committees were expected to meet at least 
quarterly, however the last known meetings took place in early 1988. The 
committees had little authority; some secretaries did not feel bound by their 
conclusions and ignored them. 
The absence of cost-effectiveness in the whole range of actions from planning 
to delivery is a major impediment to the effective delivery of social services in 
Pakistan. Over-design, low quality construction, inappropriate technology, improper 
site selection, opaque tendering procedures, and asynchronous release of funds have 
all reduced the cost-effectiveness of infrastructure development in the social sectors. 
The procedures used have been developed in such a way as to serve the vested 
interests of those seeking rents from the system. This  results in an excessive need 
for repairs and maintenance, which cannot be done for lack of funds. This scarcity of 
resources, measured as the share of non-salary expenditure of total expenditure, has 
been worsening over the years. It has been caused by a substantial increase in wages 
caused by both an increase in the numbers employed and the wage rate.  
The general practice of the finance department has been to reduce 
expenditures on operations and maintenance (O&M), and not question the wage bill. 
In the light of the resource constraints facing the public sector at all levels, increasing 
the cost-effectiveness of expenditures will not only help achieve social indicator 
targets, but also strengthen the case for allocating more funds to the social sectors. 
Increased cost-effectiveness can be attained in two ways: either by achieving greater 
output from given resources or by reducing the cost of achieving a given output. 
One of the most serious problems in social service delivery is the high level of 
wastage, particularly when resources are scarce. Examples can best be seen in 
education. The net continuation ratio by year and gender at the primary level since 
the mid-1970s shows (Graph 1) that the continuation ratios have decreased since the 
beginning of the Social Action Programme in 1992-93. A plausible reason for this 
apparent decline may be due to one factor—the shift to private schools data for 
which is conspicuous by its absence. The high dropout rate can be attributed also to 
other factors such as poverty, the high opportunity cost of education, teacher 
absenteeism, poor teaching skills, inappropriate teaching methods, and the low 
motivation among parents to educate their children, particularly in rural areas. This 
suggests a need to improve the environment in schools by providing better facilities, 
enhancing the number of qualified teachers and making the curriculum more relevant 
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Another major weakness in the systems and procedures used to manage social 
sector development and delivery is in the financial management arena. There appears 
to be no mechanism to ensure value for money or that funds are released to match 
demands. This is due not only to shortfalls and uncertain revenue flows, but also to 
the outdated systems, procedures and technology used. Budgets are prepared on the 
basis of historical trends rather than actual or estimated needs. The Finance 
Department then applies an across-the-board cut in these demands ensuring that 
these cuts do not impact on critical items of expenditure, such as travelling and daily 
allowances, the utility bills of senior staff, fuel charges and work charged staff. 
Because little attention is paid to routine maintenance, it usually ends up being 
charged to the development budget. Invariably, funds covering the purchase of 
supplies (e.g., books, surgical supplies, drugs, medicines, etc.) are deferred, and are 
released in one tranche towards the end of the year (in late May or early June). As a 
result, these are often purchased without using good buying practices. In any case, 
the amount released is not enough to meet requirements and is frequently less than 
the amount sanctioned. This leads to the purchase of non-standard materials and 
inequitable geographic distribution. 
The carry forward (continuing) costs of ongoing schemes which have 
remained incomplete at the close of one fiscal year are carried forward to the 
following year(s). In 1991-92, these costs accounted for approximately 75 percent of 
available funds. This amount has increased to over 80 percent in 1998-99. 
 
A REFORM AGENDA 
Pakistan’s impressive economic growth has not been accompanied by healthy 
social development. The country’s progress in improving its social sectors has been 
slow. Over its fifty-odd years as an independent nation social development has fallen 
behind population growth at times. By 1991, not only was it clear that Pakistan was 
lagging behind its neighbours in social development, but serious internal imbalances 
had become evident—imbalances that cut across rural-urban lines, across genders 
and across provinces.  
It was against this backdrop that SAP was launched. With rural deprivation a 
major problem, it was decided that SAP should have a rural focus. As well, SAP was 
to take an integrated approach to the four key sectors—primary education, primary 
health, rural water supply and population welfare. These were chosen both because 
they were the most basic social services required by the population and because of 
the obvious linkages and potential for synergy between them. It would appear that 
this has had little or no impact on the social sectors. In fact, all reviews and the 
government’s own statistics would tend to indicate that there has been an adverse 
impact on primary education, and little or no impact on water and sanitation. The 
health sector would appear to have fared the best. 
Impediments to social development fall within several broad areas: legislative 
framework, political structures, institutional capacity, management and efficiency. Zafar H. Ismail  734
Some of the mechanisms which can be used to overcome these impediments 
follow. Most, however, require time. One must, however, realise that changing 
institutions and societal norms cannot be achieved at the wave of a wand. Reforms, 
without revolution, require time and patience. 
In the legislative arena one of the major tasks that should be undertaken 
immediately should be a clearer definition of the several tiers of government so that 
dichotomy, fragmentation and duplication of responsibilities are removed and 
authority is clearly defined and demarcated. To contain corruption, an obvious 
mechanism would be to review legislation which helps breed corruption, such as 
through creating monopoly power, permitting discretion without checks and 
balances, exercises authority without responsibility. Another mechanism would be to 
introduce legislation which is effectively implemented through an impartial and 
independent authority (with substantial representation from civil society and the 
senior members of the judiciary). Corresponding changes in the laws of evidence and 
trial should allow for flexibility in procedures and rigour of evidence. 
Institutional reforms should be directed to achieve effective local governance. 
Effective local governance can be assured only through the active participation of a 
representative body of elected officials which has a constitutionally assured 
permanence, has participatory representation (say through proportional repre-
sentation and quotas for women, minorities and marginalised people), has 
constitutionally legislated responsibilities and authority (regulation and provision of 
the full range of services that can equitably meet the needs of the community), and 
has an assured financial resource base which is not encroached on by higher tiers of 
government, either directly or indirectly. Necessary constitutional changes should be 
undertaken. The recent change in governance structures in Pakistan may perhaps be 
the ideal occasion for this reform. Fiscal policy should clearly assign which taxes 
may be levied by whom, and if shared, assure a mechanism which ensures automatic 
credit by the Central Bank/Treasury without reference to any governmental body. 
Accountability of both the elected and the administrative hierarchy ensures 
adherence to standards and goals. This should be ensured, firstly through audit by 
non-governmental professional audit organisations, and secondly by prosecution 
through an independent tribunal under a legal framework which mandates a time-
bound process. Accountability also requires that there should be greater transparency 
and openness (accessibility) in the system. This can be assured through a number of 
actions, such as: beneficiary participation in planning; participatory budgeting; 
involvement of civil sector organisations; simplification of processes; public 
participation and audit of council debates; and access to information 
Civil service reforms need to be introduced to make the public official 
answerable for his actions. The current status of “permanent non-terminable” 
employment must be replaced by a system where the inefficient or the corrupt can be 
weeded out within a short time frame. Staff skills need to be developed to use modern 
management techniques. Mere attendance at courses operated by civil service training Impediments to Social Development  735
institutions does not constitute training. Civil servants must be required to show 
absorption of training skills by results in tests and examination (as is done in the 
defence forces). This should help in weeding out the incompetent. With greater 
reliance on the private sector for the development of infrastructure and the provision of 
services large public sector employment is unjustified. The objective would be to, at 
least, reduce overall public sector employment to a third of its current size. 
Efficiency can be achieved in a number of ways. One may be the use of 
appropriate mechanisms which ensure the greatest value for money. Other ways may 
include pro-active legislation (rather than retro-active) ensuring target based 
management, or through the use of information to analyse shortcomings and suggest 
ways to improve. Yet others may be the use of regulatory mechanisms which ensure 
that private sector provision of services and development of infrastructure does not 
create rents for the vested segments of society. All or a combination of these need to be 
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